Intelligence & Investigations

Before you can defend, negotiate or sue, you have to know who you are dealing with.

Most of what this firm does depends on one thing: a name. You cannot pressure, settle with, or bring a claim against an anonymous site, an unidentified leak or a competitor you cannot connect to anything. Attribution is where almost every engagement actually turns.

And the same capability works before there is a problem at all — which is when it is cheapest.

What we do

• Attribution. Who built the site, seeded the reviews, bought the ads, made the complaint. Technical forensics, open-source investigation, licensed investigators where the trail leaves the screen — delivered as an evidentiary package a lawyer, a platform or a prosecutor can act on
• Counterparty due diligence. Who you are about to take money from, sell to, merge with, lend to, or appoint. Ownership and control, litigation history, regulatory record, source of wealth, undisclosed conflicts, the things a data-room does not contain
• Corporate intelligence. Market, competitor and transaction intelligence from public record, filings, licensed databases, industry sources and lawful field enquiry
• Asset tracing. A judgment is a piece of paper until someone finds what the other side actually owns, and where
• Internal investigations. Leaks, fraud, conflicts of interest, an employee working for someone else — including controlled-disclosure testing and integrity testing
• Litigation support. Evidence gathering, witness location, and records obtained through proper channels, to a standard that survives challenge

Where the line is, and we will not move it

Intelligence you gather about someone is lawful. Information you take from someone is a crime. That distinction is the entire discipline, and it is the reason our findings hold up when somebody examines them afterwards.

So: public records, corporate filings, court files, licensed databases, open-source investigation, technical analysis of what the other side published themselves, interviews with people who choose to speak, and surveillance conducted lawfully by licensed professionals.

Never: trade secrets, unauthorised access to systems or accounts, obtaining financial, telephone or medical records under a false identity, paying someone's employees, or impersonating officials. Those are federal offences in the United States and criminal across the EU — and beyond the risk to you, evidence obtained that way collapses the moment it is examined, taking the case with it.

Anyone who offers you the second list will eventually offer somebody else your file.

Proof: The buyer who did not exist → · Eighteen months to a takedown → · The leak that identified its own source →